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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
CHRISTOPHER MANUEL R. TAPIA, : 
Appellate Court No. 20070844 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Appellant is appealing from a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment in 
the Second District Court for Weber County, Utah, dated August 16, 2007. 
The Defendant was found guilty of Burglary a second degree felony on August 
13, 2007. He was sentenced on the same day to an indeterminate term of one 
to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. Jurisdiction for the Appeal is 
conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO INTRODUCE 
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD 
ACTS? 
Standard of Review: This issue should be reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard of review. "When reviewing a trial court's decision to 
admit evidence under Rule 404(b), we apply an abuse of discretion standard." 
State v. Widdison, 28 P.3d 1278 (Utah 2001). In addition, this Court should 
"review the record to determine whether the admission of [prior] bad acts 
evidence was 'scrupulously examined' by the trial judge 'in the proper exercise 
of that discretion."' State v. Nelson-Wagonner, 6 P.3d 1120 (Utah 2000) 
(citations omitted). This issue was not preserved for appeal. Therefore, it 
should be reviewed under a plain error standard of review. "[T]o establish the 
existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that 
was not properly objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i) an 
error exists, (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) 
the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for the appellant . . ." State v. Dunn 850 P.2d 1201, 
1208 (Utah 1993). 
II. DID THE DEFENDANT RECEIVE INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN HIS 
ATTORNEY FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE PRIOR 
BAD ACT EVIDENCE? 
Standard of Review: This issue should be reviewed under a correction 
of error standard of review. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised 
for the first time on appeal presents a question of law" that we review for 
2 
correctness. State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ^ 6, 89 P.3d 162. Furthermore, in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United 
States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which was adopted in State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether counsel was 
ineffective. The Court held that; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable. Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b) theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
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(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or 
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5). 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses 
listed in Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the 
actor while he is in the building. 
§76-10-503. Restrictions on possession, purchase, transfer, and ownership 
of dangerous weapons by certain persons. 
(2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or knowingly agrees, 
consents, offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, possess, use, or have under 
his custody or control, or who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers, 
possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control: 
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
§76-6-1105. Unlawful possession of another's identification documents. 
(1) For purposes of this section "identifying document" means: 
(a) a government issued identifying document; 
(b) a vehicle registration certificate; or 
(c) any other document containing personal identifying information as 
defined in Subsections 76-6-1102(1 )(d) through (k). 
(2) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection 76-6-1102(3), a person 
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if he: 
(i) obtains or possesses an identifying document with knowledge that he is 
not entitled to obtain or possess the identifying document; or 
(ii) assists another person in obtaining or possessing an identifying 
document with knowledge that the person is not entitled to obtain or possess 
the identifying document. 
(b) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he: 
(i) obtains or possesses multiple identifying documents with knowledge that 
he is not entitled to obtain or possess the multiple identifying documents; or 
(ii) assists another person in obtaining or possessing multiple identifying 
documents with knowledge that the person is not entitled to obtain or possess 
the multiple identifying documents. 
(c) For purposes of Subsection (2)(b), "multiple identifying documents1' 
means identifying documents of two or more people. 
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§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; 
other crimes, 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, 
the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of 
trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of 
the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
Rule 403, Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by Information with Burglary of a Dwelling, 
a second degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-202; Possession of a 
Dangerous Weapon By a Restricted Person, a third degree felony, in violation 
of U.C.A. §76-10-503(2)(b); and Possession of Another's Identification 
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Documents, a class A misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-1105(2)(a). 
(R. 09-10) 
There were no pre-trial motions filed in this matter. A jury trial was held 
on August 13, 2007. The Defendant was convicted of the charge of Burglary, a 
second degree felony. The jury found him not guilty of the two other charges. 
(R. 130/168). The Defendant was sentenced the same day to serve an 
indeterminate sentence of one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. The 
sentence was ordered to run consecutive to another prison sentence the 
Defendant was serving. (R. 101-02). 
The Sentence, Judgment, Commitment was signed on August 17, 2007. 
(R. 101-02) The Defendant sent a pro se letter to the court on September 13, 
2007, stating his desire to appeal his conviction. (R. 106-09). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The victim in this case, Brittany Walton, was engaged to the 
Defendant's half-brother, James Duncombe. (R. 130/107). In March of 2007, 
Mr. Duncombe was in prison; and the Defendant and Brittany had been 
involved in a relationship with each other where they spent a "significant" 
amount of time together. (R. 130/108). On March 13 Brittany was with the 
Defendant at his father's house. (R. 130/108-09). The two of them returned 
from the Defendant's father's house in Sunset to Ogden on the bus. When they 
arrived in Ogden there was a dispute between them because the Defendant put 
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Brittney's son on the ground without putting his jacket over him. (R. 130/109-
110). 
Brittany decided to not go home that night because she didn't want her 
son around any more altercations. (R. 130/111). The next morning, Brittany 
went to her apartment. The Defendant was at her apartment when she arrived 
there. (R. 130/111-12). Brittany testified that she hadn't given the Defendant 
permission to be in her apartment. (R. 130/112). The Defendant was going 
through his brother's and Brittney's belongings. He had a backpack with items 
in it. (R. 130/113). Brittney told him to stop, and he told her that he was going 
to take his brother's stuff. (R. 130/113). 
Brittney told the Defendant that she was going to take her son to daycare 
and that he better be gone when she got back and that all of her property better 
still be there. (R. 130/114). Brittney returned ten minutes later, and the 
Defendant was still there going through her belongings. (R. 130/114). 
The Defendant told her that he was going to take his brother's items and 
store them. She called the police. A short time later Officer Checketts from 
the Ogden Police Department arrived. (R. 130/115). Brittney accompanied 
Officer Checketts into the apartment. The Defendant was in her bedroom. He 
had a backpack and a bag that contained Brittney's and James Duncombe's 
belongings. (R. 130/116). Inside the bags were clothes that belonged to Mr. 
Duncombe as well as a Mother Mary picture, four DVDs, a cell phone that 
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belonged to Mr. Duncombe, but that Brittney testified they both used and some 
breast feeding cream. (R. 130/117). 
The Defendant also had a knife in his back pocket that the officer found. 
Brittney testified that the knife was hers. The prosecutor asked Brittney why 
she had the knife. The following colloquy took place. 
A. I don't know if I can answer this one. I don't know if I can 
answer this one, because remember, I told you - anyways, 
somebody else gave it to me— 
Q. Was it— 
A. For protection. 
Q. Okay 
A. Okay. Is that good enough? I don't— 
Q. You can answer the question. I'm not -I 'm not trying to 
tell you what you should or should not be saying. 
A. But— 
Q. If you had it for protection, that's -
A. It was for protection from Chris [Defendant]. I'll just 
leave it at that. Because of Past instances — 
(R. 130/120). Brittney testified that she had given the Defendant permission 
to be in her apartment in the past; but she didn't give him permission on this 
day, and she didn't give him permission to take any of the items including the 
knife. (R./130/121). 
Officer Checketts testified that he talked to the Defendant that morning 
at the apartment. He asked the Defendant if he lived there, and the Defendant 
answered, "No." He also asked the Defendant if he had a key, and the 
Defendant answered, "No." (R. 130/130). 
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The Defendant told Officer Checketts that the door was unlocked and 
that he entered through the front door. He also told Officer Checketts that he 
didn't have permission to be there. Officer Checketts questioned the 
Defendant about the items in the backpack. The Defendant told him that they 
were his brothers and that he was holding them for him. Officer Checketts 
asked the Defendant if he had permission to take the items, and the Defendant 
said no and that he hadn't talked to his brother for several months. (R. 
130/131). 
Inside the backpack were several items of men's clothing, a cell phone, a 
tube of breast feeding cream, and a couple sockets from a socket wrench. (R. 
130/132). The Defendant told Officer Checketts that the cell phone was 
Brittney's, that he got the sockets from the apartment and that the breast 
feeding was for sore nipples that he was having a problem with. (R. 130/131-
33). 
Inside another bag were seven D.V.D.'s, a hammer, two cell phones, a 
Norelco shaver, a picture, and a socket wrench. (R. 130/133). The Defendant 
was questioned about the items; and he said he believed that some of them 
belonged to his brother. He also acknowledged that a few of the items 
belonged to Britney. (R. 130/133). The Defendant was arrested and during a 
search incident to arrest, Officer Checketts found a knife in Defendant's pocket 
and Mr. Duncombe's identification card. (R. 130/134-35). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when his 
attorney failed to object to the State's use of irrelevant prior bad act evidence. 
The State elicited testimony from the victim that she had a knife for protection 
because of past instances with the Defendant. This evidence was highly 
prejudicial and served no legitimate purpose to prove any of the elements of 
the offense. It was not used for a non-character purpose under Rule 404(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. It was used to show that Defendant had a bad 
character and acted in conformity therewith. For these reasons, the 
Defendant's conviction should be reversed and the matter should be remanded 
to the trial court for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO INTRODUCE 
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD 
ACTS. 
The prosecutor introduced evidence of Defendant's prior bad acts during 
the trial. The victim apparently recognized that she probably shouldn't talk 
about them, but the prosecutor encouraged her to continue. The colloquy that 
is complained of is as follows: 
Q. Why did you have that knife? 
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A. Because — I don't know if I can answer this one. I don't know if I 
can answer this one, because remember, I told you - anyways, 
somebody else gave it to me— 
Q. Was it— 
A. For protection. 
Q. Okay 
A, Okay. Is that good enough? I don't— 
Q. You can answer the question. I'm not -I'm not trying to tell you 
what you should or should not be saying. 
A. But— 
Q. If you had it for protection, that's -
A. It was for protection from Chris [Defendant]. I'll just leave it at 
that. Because of past instances — 
(R. 130/120) There was no relevance as to why the victim had the knife. The 
only reason the prosecutor could have solicited that information was to show 
that Defendant had a bad character and there had been instances in the past that 
caused the victim to believe she needed a knife to protect herself from him. 
In State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that "this Court has repeatedly held that evidence of other crimes may 
not be admitted to prove that the defendant has a bad character or a disposition 
to commit the crime charged." Id. at 1075. Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence states: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is 
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets 
the requirements of 402 and 403.U.R.E. 404(b). 
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In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that "[t]o give meaning to the policy 
embodied in Rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes must be reasonably 
necessary and highly probative of a material issue." State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 
at 1075. The Defendant's prior bad acts didn't help show any of the non-
character purposes envisioned by Rule 404(b). In State v. Featherson, 781 
P.2d 424 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court held that for prior bad acts to 
be admissible at trial, there had to be "a special relevance to a controverted 
issue and is introduced for a purpose other than to show the defendant's 
predisposition to criminality." Id. at 426. 
The State didn't need the evidence as to why the victim owned a knife to 
prove any of the elements of the crimes the Defendant was charged with. The 
evidence suggested that the Defendant had stolen the knife from Brittney. 
Therefore, her reasons for owning it were irrelevant. They could only be used 
to show that she was fearful of the Defendant to the point that she needed a 
knife to protect herself. This is not the kind of prior bad act evidence 
envisioned by Rule 404(b). 
Even if evidence of other crimes has relevance beyond proving mere 
criminal disposition, it is still subject to the protections of Rule 403 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The 
factors a court should consider when weighing the probative value of prior 
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conviction evidence against its prejudicial effect are "the similarities between 
the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need 
for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the 
evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." Id. 
The trial Court did not do a Rule 403 analysis. The Court failed to 
address the similarities between the Defendant's bad acts, the interval of time 
between the crimes, the need for the evidence and the effect the evidence 
would have on the jury. Since the trial court failed to engage in a Rule 403 
analysis, this Court should reverse Defendant's conviction. 
In order to constitute reversible error, the error complained must "be 
sufficiently prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for the defendant in its absence." State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 
(Utah 1989). In State v. Cox, this Court stated that, "[although the State 
presented evidence on which might be sufficient to sustain a rape conviction, 
we are nevertheless persuaded that the jury may have reached a different result 
in the absence of the highly prejudicial evidence of the prior sexual assaults." 
State v. Cox, 787 P.2d at 7. 
Informing the jury that the Defendant had been involved in other 
"instances" that caused the victim to believe she needed a knife to protect 
herself was highly prejudicial. If the "taint" caused by inadmissible evidence 
is sufficient, "it is irrelevant that there is sufficient untainted evidence to 
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support a verdict." State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989). 
Because the prior bad act evidence is so highly prejudicial, the Defendant's 
conviction should be reversed, and the Defendant should receive a new trial. 
When the prosecutor elicited this prior bad act evidence the Defendant's 
attorney failed to object to it. Therefore, this Court should find that the trial 
court committed plain error when it allowed this information into evidence. 
All of the elements of plain error outlined in State v. Dunn 850 P.2d 1201, 
(Utah 1993) are met. First, the error exists. The State introduced prior bad act 
evidence that wasn't relevant and didn't help assist in any non-character way. 
Second, the error should have been obvious to the trial court. Rule 404(b) is 
one of the most litigated rules in criminal law. There's a body of case law 
supporting Rule 404(b) and the exclusion of prior bad act evidence unless the 
evidence is "reasonably necessary and highly probative of a material issue." 
State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d at 1075. Third, the error was harmful. This 
"burglary" was committed by a person who in the past had a key to the 
apartment, had spent the night on a number of occasions, and was in some type 
of relationship with the victim where they had spent a considerable amount of 
time together. (See, R. 123-25). 
Furthermore, the majority of the items the Defendant took belonged to 
his brother who was in prison. Absent the prior bad act evidence there is "a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. . ." State 
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v. Dunn 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). For these reasons, the trial court 
should have recognized the error and taken steps to correct it during the trial. 
II. THE DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN HIS 
ATTORNEY FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE PRIOR 
BAD ACT EVIDENCE. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to 
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the 
Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's 
assistance was ineffective. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 
687, 80L.Ed.2dat693. 
There error complained of in this matter was counsel's failure to object 
to the prior bad act evidence that was presented. As has been argued above, 
prior bad act evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) only when it is used for 
a noncharacter purpose, "such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). 
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The evidence that the victim had a knife to protect herself from the 
Defendant because of past "instances" didn't assist the State with any of the 
noncharacter purposes outlined in Rule 404(b). It was highly prejudicial to the 
Defendant and served no relevant or legitimate purpose. There was no valid 
reason to not object to that evidence. There was also no trial strategy that 
would cause an attorney to allow this prejudicial information into evidence. 
For this reason, this Court should find that the first prong of the Strickland test 
has been met. 
The second prong of the two-part test articulated in Strickland is "the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary 
to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805 
P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that to meet the second 
part of the Strickland test a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 
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187(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In making 
the determination that counsel was ineffective the appellate court should 
"consider the totality of the evidence, taking into account such factors as 
whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect 
and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Id. 
This is a case where the Defendant was convicted of committing a 
burglary. There was evidence presented that in the past the Defendant had a 
key to the apartment, that he had spent the night on a number of occasions and 
was in some type of relationship with the victim where they had spent a 
considerable amount of time together. (See, R. 123-25). In addition, the 
majority of the items taken arguably belonged to the Defendant's brother, and 
he told both the victim and the police that he was going to keep them for his 
brother. 
When the evidentiary picture is looked at in its entirety, it is very likely 
that counsel's failure to object to the prior bad act evidence affected the verdict 
and this Court should not have confidence in the outcome. For these reasons 
the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction and 
remand the matter back to the trial court for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant was prejudiced by the admission of his prior bad act 
evidence. The State elicited evidence that the victim had a knife for protection 
17 
and that she had the knife because of past instances with the Defendant. This 
evidence was inadmissible under Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. It was not used for a proper non-character purpose and was only 
used to inflame the jury and show he had a bad character. Without this 
evidence there is a strong probability that the Defendant would have received a 
more favorable outcome. Furthermore, his attorney was ineffective in failing 
to object to this evidence. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully 
requests this Court to reverse his conviction for burglary. 
DATED this 4th day of April 2008. 
DEE W. SMITH 
Attorney for Appellant 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
^ LL .TrJCT COURT 
Z001 AUG I I P 2: Lin 
Vn y 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
CHRISTOPHER MANUEL R TAPIA, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 071900496 FS 
Judge: SCOTT M HADLEY 
Date: August 13, 2 007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marykd 
Prosecutor: LYON, NATHAN D 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROY COLE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 14, 1983 
Video 
Tape Number: HO81307 Tape Count: 9 05 PM 
CHARGES 
1. BURGLARY - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/13/2007 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 2nd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
ccMTCwrP JUDGMENT COMMITMENT 
CD19776833 P a 9 e s : 
071900496 TAPlA,CHRISTOPHER MANUEL 
P a g e 1 
Case No: 071900496 
Date: Aug 13, 2007 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The prison sentence imposed in this case is to run consecutively to 
the prison sentence the defendant is now serving. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court recommends credit time served for all time served on this 
case. 
Dated this /£ day of <$Ctf\ , 20 07 . 
SCOTT M HADLEY 
District Court Judge 
Page 2 (last) 
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1 A. YES, IT'S MINE. 
2 Q. AND HAD YOU — WHERE HAD YOU LEFT THAT KNIFE LAST? 
3 A. I HAD HAD IT -- I DON'T REMEMBER EXACTLY. I THINK IT 
4 WAS UP IN THE CUBBYHOLE BECAUSE I PUT IT UP TO WHERE MY SON 
5 COULDN'T GET TO IT, I KNOW THAT. 
6 Q. WAS IT IN YOUR APARTMENT? 
7 A. YES, IT WAS IN MY APARTMENT. 
8 Q. WHY DID YOU HAVE THAT KNIFE? 
9 A. BECAUSE — I DON'T KNOW IF I CAN ANSWER THIS ONE. I 
10 DON'T KNOW IF I CAN ANSWER THIS ONE, BECAUSE REMEMBER, I TOLD 
11 YOU -- ANYWAYS, SOMEBODY ELSE GAVE IT TO ME — 
121 Q. WAS IT --
13 A. — FOR PROTECTION. 
14 Q. OKAY. 
15 A. OKAY. IS THAT GOOD ENOUGH? I DON'T — 
16 Q. YOU CAN ANSWER THE QUESTION. I'M NOT — I'M NOT TRYING 
17 TO TELL YOU WHAT YOU SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE SAYING. 
18 A. BUT --
19 Q. IF YOU HAD IT FOR PROTECTION, THAT'S ~ 
20 A. IT WAS FOR PROTECTION FROM CHRIS. I'LL JUST LEAVE IT AT 
21 THAT. BECAUSE OF PAST INSTANCES — 
22 Q. DID HE INDICATE ANYTHING TO YOU ABOUT WHAT HE WAS GOING 
23 TO DO WITH THAT KNIFE? 
24 A. NO. 
25 Q. DID YOU HEAR HIM SAY WHAT HE WAS INTENDING TO DO WITH 
